Download c&c ta8/29/2023 ![]() ![]() The table below lists the signs of suspicious activity that were the starting point for the investigation by the SOC. The attacker’s final goals are thus unknown. The incident was detected in a timely manner, so the attacker did not have the time to follow through. This created a suspicious WMI consumer, later classified by MDR as an additional persistence mechanism. e圎 / Q / c for / f "tokens=1,2 delims= " ^ % A in ( '"tasklist /fi "Imagename eq lsass.exe" | find "lsass""' ) do rundll32. While investigating, we found that the process had initiated network connections to a potential C&C server:ĬMd. The memory space belongs to the process c:\windows\system32\. The incident started with Kaspersky MDR detecting the use of a comprehensive toolset for security assessment, presumably Cobalt Strike, by an antimalware (AM) engine memory scan (MEM:). Case #1: Cloudflare Workers as redirectors Case description Kaspersky has reported several incidents where attackers used cloud services for C&C. The use of public cloud services like Amazon, Azure or Google can make an attacker’s server difficult to spot. We hope that learning about the attacks that took place in the wild helps you to stay up to date on the modern threat landscape and to be better prepared for attacks. ![]() The goal of the report is to inform our customers about techniques used by attackers. This report describes several interesting incidents observed by the Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response (MDR) team. ![]()
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